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Introduction
J
apanese people apparently share an affinity with India for several reasons, one being its 
history as the cradle of Buddhism. In October 2017, the Kabukiza Theater in Tokyo gave a 
performance of the War Chronicles of Mahabharata, one of the world’s three greatest epics 
and a tale that provides a glimpse into views on human nature and the universe that differ 
from those in the West. That could be why the theater tickets were sold out for consecutive days. 
Based on this affinity, Japan-India relations grew steadily closer and stronger through the 
Meiji era and thereafter.1 This trend grew even more pronounced in the post–Cold War period. If 
the 1990s marked an preparatory phase, then the 2000s were a transitional phase while the 2010s 
have brought a huge leap forward. One of the more prominent trends through the 2010s was that 
bilateral relations evolved from a purely bilateral relationship and assumed importance within a 
broader, multilateral context. The combination of the relative decline of US power and the rapid 
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ascension of China and India is among the factors that contributed to such transformation. The 
emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a cross-regional concept may be cited as yet another factor and 
one that interlinks with these trends.
In this paper, I present a general review of Japan-India relations in recent years2 together with 
an analysis and study of trends of countries concerned on the concept of the Indo-Pacific, India’s 
striving for major-power status, and the quadrilateral framework between Japan, the US, India, 
and Australia (“the Quad”). To summarize my conclusions here, although the future direction of 
Japan-India ties will undoubtedly develop through their responses to China, it is also necessary 
to creatively build a forward-looking regional framework while keeping future developments in 
mind beyond the Quad.
1. The transitional phase in Japan-India relations: Factors fueling closer ties 
since the 2000s
Although Japan-India relations had steadily improved following the Cold War, they suffered an 
abrupt setback when India conducted a series of nuclear tests in 1998.3 As a country that had 
centered its foreign policy on the abolition of nuclear weapons, Japan was unable to show any 
tolerance for these new nuclear tests. This period may be described as a preparatory phase 
during which the two countries sought to re-establish their bilateral relationship.
1.1 The advancement of economic ties between Japan and India
It was the 2000s and thereafter when the two countries clearly improved the bilateral relations. 
From a birds-eye perspective, their bilateral economic ties were the first driving force of that 
development. The Indian economy demonstrated steady gains backed by liberalization policies 
implemented since 1991, and eventually achieved average annual growth of 7.4 percent4 through 
the first decade of the 21st century. In 1993, India unveiled its Look East policy5 and on that basis 
began working to cultivate stronger economic ties with the countries of East and Southeast Asia.
By contrast, Japan in the early 2000s found itself confronted by the necessity of averting 
certain “China risks.” More specifically, by 2004 the scale of bilateral trade between Japan and 
China had reached 22 trillion yen, surpassing the 20 trillion yen in trade between Japan and the 
United States, thus making China Japan’s largest trading partner. However, around this same 
period, a series of large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations and riots broke out across China. 
As one outcome, India began to appear ideal as a new market for Japan. In 2003, India displaced 
China as the largest recipient of yen loans. Official development assistance (ODA) functioned as a 
“connector” to strengthened Japan-India ties.6
1.2 Improved ties between India and the US
The second factor behind better Japan-India relations was the improvement of India-US relations. 
Over approximately seven decades following the Independence in 1947, India’s foreign policy had 
been characterized by a history of trial-and-error in how to position the US in its foreign policy 
and how to cultivate ties with it on that basis.7 In fact, it would not be an overstatement to describe 
India’s foreign policy through that period in terms of the history of its relationship with the US. 
Although India-US ties began improving in the 1990s, they suffered a setback following India’s 
nuclear tests in 1998. Then US President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000, the first-ever 
visit by a US President since Carter’s 22 years earlier, impetus for improved relations emerged 
and continued to grow after the George W. Bush administration came to power in 2001.
As a country that had made the Japan-US alliance the backbone of its own foreign policy, 
Japan viewed the advancement of India’s relationship with the US as an opportunity to improve its 
relations with India. During the Cold War era, India pursued a foreign policy stance centered on 
nonalignment together with the continuation of its alliance with the Soviet Union, and thus had 
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little if any latitude for improved relations with the US. At that time, Delhi’s limited relations with 
Washington exerted a negative impact on its relations with Tokyo. During a stay in New Delhi in 
November 2017, I was told by an Indian expert of international politics that “following the Second 
World War, Japanese foreign policy has been interlocked with the Japan-US alliance; during the 
Cold War, it was anti-communist, but since the end of the Cold War, it has been anti-China.” That 
perspective may carry an element of truth. In any case, we cannot deny the fact that Japan-India 
ties have advanced in tandem with the improvement in India-US relations.
Up until the 1990s, India’s foreign policy frequently reflected a pro-Soviet, and later, pro-
Russian, stance, but under went changes that eventually gave it an increasingly pro-US 
complexion over time. For example, Rajesh Rajagopalan professor of Jawaharlal Nehre University 
in international politics known for past skepticism regarding closer India-US ties, asserts that 
establishing stronger relations with the US is currently the only ef fective strategic option 
available to India that will help it protect its interests and ensure its security.8
2. China’s expansion into the Indo-Pacific and Japan-India relations
2.1 China’s expansion into the Indo-Pacific 
China counts as a third factor that has fostered closer ties between Japan and India. To put this 
into better perspective, China since the 2000s has developed into a major economic and military 
power and pursued an assertive foreign policy. These trends have had the effect of encouraging 
closer Japan-India ties, which in turn have been reinforced by the Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical 
area.
To elaborate, the Asia-Pacific or Asia as a whole were for an a pretty long period the 
principal regions of interest to Japanese foreign policy.9 However, in the mid-2000s China began 
implementing an Indian Ocean sea lane strategy that others have labeled the “String of Pearls” 
strategy.10 Further, in 2010 it surpassed Japan to become the world’s second-largest economy in 
terms of gross domestic product (GDP) and pursued aggressive maritime military policies in 
the East and South China Seas. Not only that, but beginning in 2013 it also began expanding its 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). BRI comprises a series of port and harbor infrastructure projects 
across the Indian Ocean rim including includes the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 
project.
Consequently, it was not possible for India to view China’s activities in the international 
arena as someone else’s problem. Sushma Swaraj was the Minister of External Affairs for the 
government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi assumed office in May 2014. At a conference of 
heads of Indian diplomatic missions abroad that assembled in August that year, she called for 
the implementation of measures in line with the Act East policy that would move India from 
merely “looking” to “acting”. After the Modi government came into power, the Indo-Pacific found 
increasingly frequent use within in the Indian strategic community as a policy-based regional 
concept; furthermore, this concept carries certain strategic implications.
2.2 A new phase in the strategic relationship between Japan and India
India demonstrated an awareness that resonates with the Indo-Pacific strategy crafted by Japan 
and began engaging in external actions on that basis. For that reason, it seems safe to conclude 
that Japan and India are capable of pursuing joint actions involving the Indo-Pacific. In fact, since 
the start of the 2000s, relations between the two countries have been accented by the launch 
of numerous regular meetings and the conclusion of various agreements. After Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi paid a state visit to India in 2005, the two countries began holding reciprocal 
state visits by their prime ministers every two years. Additionally, in 2006 the Japan-India 
relationship was elevated to a Global and Strategic Partnership. While these steps had several 
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business and trade-related objectives, among them the implementation of a Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 201111 and the holding of the first Cabinet-level 
business dialogue the following year, they were primarily concerned with strategic and security-
oriented issues.12 To summarize, responding to an ascendant China was their main objective.
Sanjaya Baru, journalist, who served as media advisor to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 
has noted that during the second term of India National Congress (INC) government led by 
Singh (2009 to 2014), its major diplomatic achievement was the closer bilateral relations between 
India and Japan.13 Those accomplishments coincided with the birth of the second government of 
Shinzo Abe (from 2012), who had championed treating the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a single 
geopolitical unit.
3. The Indo-Pacific and India’s foreign policy foundations
3.1 India, a country striving for major-power status
The rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi also 
factored significantly behind the increasingly close-knit ties between Japan and India. With 
its victory in the 2014 general election, the BJP forced the INC out and assumed the reins of 
government. Backed by an aggressive Hindu nationalist platform, the BJP made the “Shreshtha 
Bharat” initiative the centerpiece of its public commitment. In English, the Hindi “Shreshtha” 
roughly translates as excellence (whereas “Bharat” refers to “India”).
In effect, the BJP demonstrated that it would seek to transform India into a major power. This 
objective was further highlighted during a conference of Indian heads of diplomatic missions 
abroad in New Delhi in February 2015, about nine months after the inauguration of the new Modi 
government. Modi called on Indian ambassadors worldwide to help India move beyond purely 
upholding the balance of power and instead assume a leading role in world affairs. The drive to 
fulfill this role was widely accepted as a natural extension of the BJP’s “Shreshtha Bharat” election 
pledge. 
However, subsequent remarks made on July 20, 2015 by Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam 
Jaishankar had the effect of bringing India’s quest for major-power status squarely into the 
public spotlight. In a lecture address delivered at the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS) in Singapore, the foreign secretary stated in a nutshell India aspires to become a leading 
power rather than just a balancing power. A “leading power” can also be interpreted as meaning a 
“dominant state.” Here, it may be best understood simply as referring to a “major power” or “great 
power.” Foreign Secretary Jaishankar’s words essentially built on Modi’s remarks and shed light 
on their true meaning.
The declaration of intent to seek major-power status signified a crucial turning point in Indian 
diplomacy. Although foreign policy under the INC government also revealed India’s interest in 
becoming a leading power, it was distinguished by an emphasis on ensuring “strategic autonomy.” 
The key points in Nonalignment 2.0,14 a semi-official policy paper released in 2012 by the Centre 
for Policy Research, a private think tank, stood as a representative example of this stance.
3.2 The strategic framework for current Indian diplomacy
The strategic matrix shown in Table 1 images the structural compositions of Indian foreign policy 
aiming to achieve major-power status, in other words, its foreign policy platform since the mid-
2010s. If summarized, the key point of Indian diplomacy as pursued by the Modi administration 
can be categorized in three levels: global, regional (Indo-Pacific), and local (South Asia).
At the global level, India cooperates with China and Russia to foster the creation of a 
multipolar international order as the early stages of its quest for major-power status. As a parallel 
endeavor, it also engages in efforts to boost its own national prosperity and military strength. At 
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the regional (Indo-Pacific) level, however, it endeavors to develop a larger presence and evolve 
into a maritime power and advance its Act East policies in the political and economic spheres 
through cooperation with Japan, the United States, and Australia. Politics at the local level (South 
Asia) will comprise a subset of regional level and try to secure its hegemonistic position. At this 
Table 1. India’s Strategic Foreign Policy Matrix
Goals (〇 ), Measures (–), Future Objectives (*) 
Global level 〇  Multipolarization of the international system (revisionist orientation), 
strengthening national wealth and military power
–  Cooperation with China and Russia (BRICS of Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa summits, Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO], 
Russia-India-China [RIC] foreign ministers’ meetings)
– Acquisition of permanent member status on UN Security Council
– Military buildup (with sustained nuclear capability) 
–  Development of diplomatic infrastructure (such as forming strategic 
partnerships, etc.)
*  Achievement of major-power status with acquiring capacity for building 
the international order 
Regional level
(Indo-Pacific,
etc.)
[Asia & Western Pacific]
〇  Strengthened presence and status as maritime power
–  Cooperation within Quadrilateral framework (Japan, US, Australia, India) 
(steps to counter China)
–  Advancement of political and economic now Act East policies, 
cooperation with ASEAN economies, etc.
[Middle East, Indian Ocean]
〇  Establishment of superiority 
– Actions to counter China-Pakistan axis including BRI
– Promote regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean
–  Cooperation with countries in Middle East and East Africa (harnessing 
Indian migrant resources and securing access to energy resources)
* Major-power status in the Indo-Pacific
(Additionally, since the mid-2010s India has been moving forward with its 
International North-South Transport Corridor plan. The goal is to build a 
multi-modal cargo shipping network of sea-, rail-, and road-based corridors 
connecting India [Mumbai], with Iran [Chabahar Port], Azerbaijan, and 
Russia.)
Local level
(South Asia)
〇  Achivement of hegemonic status (with orientation toward status-
quoism)
– Steps to counter China-Pakistan axis
– Economic integration of South Asia
* Establishment of hegemony
(Source)  Takenori Horimoto, “Explaining India’s Foreign Policy: From Dream to Realization of 
Major Power,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 17, Issue 3 (September 
2017)〈https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/doi/10.1093/irap/〉
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level, India is currently concentrating its efforts to counter China.15, 16 Due to this complexity of 
different sets of policies at different levels, from Japan’s perspective, India appears to be pursuing 
an inconsistent foreign policy that blends coordination with China and Russia on the one hand 
with cooperation with Japan and the US on the other.
4. The Quadrilateral framework (“the Quad”) in the Indo-Pacific
As long as the Indo-Pacific occupies a pivotal position in Chinese foreign policy, an atmosphere 
of serious apprehension will compel India to respond. That concern has been given symbolic 
expression by the Indian Navy. A document on naval strategy (Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian 
Maritime Security Strategy)17 released in 2015 was the first official publication to formally refer 
to the Indo-Pacific, and as such, presented areas of interest broader in scope than a similar 
document (Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Strategy) released in 2007. That being the 
case, one question is how India plans to engage with Japan, the US, and Australia. Although that 
question was not covered in the 2015 document, Gurpreet S. Khurana, an expert on military 
affairs in the Indo-Pacific has illustrated the issue in Fig. 1. In other words, to counter China in 
India
Area of primary interest
Area of secondary interest
Western Pacific
Indian Ocean
Fig. 1. Maritime Areas of Interest to India
(Source)  Gurpreet S. Khurana, “India’s Maritime Strategy: Context and Subtext,” Maritime 
Affairs: Journal of The National Maritime Foundation of India, April 19, 2017 (http://
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09733159.2017.1309747).
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the Indo-Pacific, military cooperation between Japan, the US, Australia, and India will be a must.
The Indo-Pacific is a pivotal part of China’s BRI and is also the most important oceanic region 
to India (especially the Indian Ocean). As such, it is destined to become a theater for rivalry 
between these two countries.18 India has achieved rapid gains in national power in recent years. 
One example is its GDP, which in 2018 was ranked seventh-largest in the world, up from 12th in 
2006.19 Another example is defense spending, in which India was ranked fourth worldwide in 2018, 
surpassing Japan’s ninth-place ranking.20 Nonetheless, India still trails far behind China, which is 
currently ranked second in terms of both GDP and defense spending. Given these statistics, India 
will face the necessity of joining hands with other countries. The quadrilateral framework (“the 
Quad”) and closer ties with Japan will be the principal countermeasures to that end.
This will not be the first time India has sought multilateral cooperation. It has continued to 
pursue cooperation and diplomacy with other countries since gaining its independence in 1947. As 
a country, India is usually associated with the nonaligned movement. While that impression is not 
off the mark, it is only half the truth. The other half is that India has also pursued alliances and 
partnerships with other countries. In effect, up through the 1960s, Indian diplomacy was shaped 
by a policy of nonalignment and oriented toward cooperation with other nonaligned countries. 
Through the next two decades the 1970s and 1980s India aligned itself with the Soviet bloc.
4.1 The Quad in the mid-2000s
Moving from the preparatory phase in its foreign policy through the 1990s,21 India in the early 
2000s once again turned to partnerships and diplomacy in response to the aggressive foreign 
policy of a rapidly ascendant China. As one consequence, it was compelled to participate in the 
Quad. From a different vantage point, at least in terms of countering Chinese policies through 
the 2000s and thereafter, Japan, the US, Australia, and India applied a mixture of engagement and 
hedging policies, albeit marked by varying degrees of intensity. The Quad framework itself was a 
classic hedging policy.
In the mid-2000s, Japan, the US, and Australia began intensifying their efforts in engagement 
with one another for the Quad framework with participation by India. During the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders’ summit that convened in Sydney in September 2007, 
Japan, the US, and Australia held their first top-level trilateral meeting. Quoting a Japanese 
Foreign Ministry press officer in its September 7 edition, one Indian newspaper22 reported that 
India had been asked to participate in the meeting as a country with a shared interest in the 
ideals of liberalism and democracy. Japan’s 2007 White Paper on Defense (July 2007) also cited 
strengthened cooperation with Australia and India and called for policies that would help curb 
the growing prominence of China and North Korea in the military dimension and ensure a more 
stable balance of security at the regional level through strengthened collaboration by Australia 
and India on matters of security.
Additionally, in August 2007 the US Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
published The US-Japan-India Report in collaboration with the Japan Institute of International 
Affairs and the Confederation of Indian Industry. Underlining the importance to the US, Japan, 
and India of protecting their shared values and sustaining an open and stable international 
system, this report recommended strengthened trilateral cooperation (along with Australia) in 
the security, energy, environmental, and economic fields.23 Although described as something that 
should not be construed as “targeting China” per se, the plan nevertheless resembled aspects of 
the Quad, which comprised hedging policies aimed at China.
As an outcome of this report, India decided to participate in the Quad. In September 2007, 
five countries of the US, Japan, India, Australia, and Singapore conducted Malabar 07-2, a joint 
naval exercise in Bay of Bengal. The scope of this exercise extended from the central region of 
the Bay of Bengal to the vicinity of the Coco Islands in Myanmar territorial waters (where China 
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was noted in India to have stationed meteorological monitoring facilities). Malabar 07-2 was a 
large-scale undertaking that mobilized approx. 20,000 naval personnel, 28 ships, and 150 aircraft; 
its implementation as a multilateral exercise was the key feature that distinguished it from past 
Malabar exercises by India and the US.
The countries that participated in Malabar 07-2 insisted that the exercise was primarily aimed 
at boosting the interoperability of their naval forces and stressed that it was not intended to 
establish an “axis of democracy” in the Asia-Pacific to contain China.24 However, the Kyodo News 
agency was arguably closer to the mark with its assessment that it was aimed at strengthening 
cooperation by participating countries in protecting the sea lanes for oil tankers and other cargo 
traffic from the Indian Ocean into the Pacific. Kyodo reported that “such objectives also reflect 
a conscious interest in curbing efforts by China to provide aid to Indian Ocean basin countries 
and expand its network for military cooperation and that Japan considers the exercises to be 
an integral element of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Japan, the US, India, and 
Australia, as proposed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.”25
The Quad drew harsh criticism from China. Furthermore, following the political exit of its 
main proponents, namely, US President George W. Bush, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 
and Australian Prime Minister John Howard, Howard’s successor, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd 
(December 2007 to June 2010), implemented policies that put stronger emphasis on ties with 
China. Rudd also was not supportive of the Quad and thus terminated Australia’s involvement, 
leaving the Quad to die out spontaneously. However, the Quad lived on as a series of bilateral 
policy hedges against China: Specifically, these were the New Framework for the US-India 
Defense Relationship (2005), the India-Australia Memorandum of Understanding on Defense 
(2006) and Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (2009), and the Joint Declaration on 
Security Cooperation between Japan and India (2008), for Japan, the first such arrangement with 
a country other than the US or Australia. 
Although the Quad was shelved, Japan’s gradually strengthening security ties with Australia 
and India along with the Japan-US alliance nevertheless sent a signal that a new security order 
was taking shape in Asia.26 In short, the Quad may be better understood in terms of its association 
with the Indo-Pacific, a new regional designation that emerged in the 2000s.
4.2 Efforts to promote the Quad by Japan, the US, and Australia in the 2010s
With that historical backdrop, on November 12, 2017 senior officials for diplomatic authorities 
in Japan, the US, Australia, and India met on the occasion of the ASEAN summit in Manila. They 
“discussed measures to ensure a free and open international order based on the rule of law 
in the Indo-Pacific” and “affirmed their commitment to continuing discussions and deepening 
cooperation based on shared values and principles” (“Australia-Japan-India-US Consultations on 
the Indo-Pacific,” a November 12, 2017 press release on the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
website).27
These four-way consultations by diplomatic authorities represented a substantive first 
step toward implementation of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy championed by Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe at the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD 
VI) that assembled in Kenya in August 2016.28 Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Kono 
proposed the creation of a new quadrilateral framework at the August 2017 gathering of foreign 
ministers for the seventh Japan-US-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue in Manila, and again 
on the occasion of the Japan-US-India Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in New York.29 Kono 
articulated his views on creating a summit-level quadrilateral strategic dialogue again on October 
25, 2017.30 During their November 2017 summit meeting in Japan, US President Donald Trump 
and Prime Minister Abe were in agreement on the Indo-Pacific strategy.
This latest Quad proposal presents Japan in a cheerleading role and appears to have won 
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support from the US for a transition from diplomacy centered around the US and China to a 
new framework that allows them to use relationship with India as a diplomatic card. During the 
Obama administration, the US advanced an Asia policy that paired the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) in the economic and trade spheres with a policy of strategic rebalancing to the Indo-Pacific 
or Asia. However, under the “America First” policies of President Trump, the US withdrew from 
the TPP. As a consequence, during his November 2017 tour of Asia, President Trump arguably 
had little choice other than to join the Indo-Pacific strategy championed by Japan. In Washington 
on October 18, 2017, prior to the state visit to Asia, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson clarified 
his views regarding security cooperation by Japan, the US, India, and Australia.31
T. J. Pempel (University of California) has summarized the first year of Trump’s administration 
as an exercise in “democratic destruction and Asian absenteeism.”32 Also, immediately prior to his 
tour of Asia, Trump and his national security advisor, H.R. McMaster, reportedly began using the 
term “Indo-Pacific” with increased frequency.33
In the National Security Strategy that it released in December 2017, the US government 
revealed a sense of alarm toward China and Russia, and criticized China as a country that “seeks 
to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region” and “expand the reaches of its state-driven 
economic model.”34 It noted that the United States “welcomes India’s emergence as a leading 
global power and stronger strategic and defense partner,” and added that it “will seek to increase 
quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India.”35 
However, not all changes to US policy on Asia are attributable to the arrival of President 
Trump. On the importance of Japan and China to the US, Sheila Smith, a leading scholar in 
the field of Japan studies, points out that building cooperative ties with China while avoiding 
harm to the close relationship between Japan and the US is the biggest challenge that US 
policymakers face.36 Given the implications of that perspective, the Quad is at present probably an 
appropriate framework for consultations at the diplomatic level. The American political scientist 
John Mearsheimer notes that a behind-the-scenes approach that places most of the burden of 
containing China on neighboring countries is the best strategy for the US as a country with a rich 
history as an “offshore balancer.”37
New perspectives have also been tendered on the role of US Forces in Japan. For example, 
Mikio Haruna, a journalist who has examined released US diplomatic documents with confidential 
content, states that the reality of the Japan-US alliance, that is, the US forces stationed in Japan, 
are not there to defend Japan but rather to provide for the strategic defense of South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Southeast Asia, and concludes that military logistics are their main mission.38 
Published in November 2017, Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper39 repeatedly 
discusses the Indo-Pacific. In Chapter 3 (A stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific),40 the white paper 
notes, “Our alliance with the United States is central to Australia’s security and sits at the core of 
our strategic and defense planning.” On that understanding, it follows up by stressing the central 
roles of the US and China in the Indo-Pacific and cites Japan, Indonesia, India, and South Korea 
as partners in the Indo-Pacific region. Another white paper (Australia in the Asian Century)41 
released by the Australian government in 2012 only mentions the Indo-Pacific in three places.
Within the sphere of foreign trade, Australia is heavily dependent on China. In 2016, exports 
to China were valued at US$94.0 billion, making China the top destination market for Australian 
goods. (Japan was the second-largest market, valued at US$39.0 billion, while the US came 
in third place, at US$21.0 billion.) China was also the largest source of Australian imports, at 
US$62.0 billion in value (followed by the US at US$44.0 billion and Japan in third place at US$23.0 
billion).42 Moreover, China’s powers of influence over Australia’s internal affairs have grown 
more serious in recent years.43 In effect, Australia has established economic ties with China that 
compare with its ties to ASEAN, a situation that in strategic terms has compromised its ability to 
cope even as a member of the Quad.
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4.3 Mixed views toward the Quad
Scholars in the US have expressed doubts about the reincarnation of the Quad as version 2.0.44 
It is true that on his visit to India in September 2017, Prime Minister Abe coordinated views with 
Prime Minister Modi on maritime security and agreed on the subject of curbing China’s advances 
into the region. Despite reaching an agreement to “continue the discussions,” the November 
2017 conference of diplomatic authorities for the four Quad countries did not set a clear timetable 
for the next round. Further, participation in the discussions has been limited to officers at the 
bureau-head level. Presumably, India will hold the key that determines whether the meetings are 
upgraded to the foreign-minister level. In effect, it is as if Japan, the US, Australia, and India do 
not share equal levels of commitment to the Quad.
Comparable precedents exist. Prior to the start of these quadrilateral discussions, two 
trilateral conferences had been held: one involving Japan, the US, and India, and the other 
involving Japan, India, and Australia. The Conference involving Japan, the US, and India was 
launched in December 2011 after participation had been downgraded to the bureau-head level 
from its initially planned foreign-minister level. This (bureau-head level) trilateral conference 
convened eight times until its conclusion in 2016. The first foreign-minister level meeting was 
held in 2015. In effect, India was integrated into the existing Japan-US framework.45 The first 
meeting of the other trilateral conference with the participation of foreign secretaries from Japan, 
Australia, and India was held in 2015 and concluded with its third meeting in 2017.
India’s China-oriented foreign policy was one reason that factored strongly behind its lack of 
enthusiasm for the Quad. When the Modi government came into power, Sandy Gordon, an expert 
on South Asia (Australian National University), predicted: “That realisation may not stop the Modi 
government attempting to ‘play both ends against the middle,’ especially since this approach 
has been a classic feature of Indian foreign policy for many decades. Under this scenario, India 
would seek the best deal it can from China, both economically and in terms of a possible border 
settlement, while attempting to maintain its hedge against a possible difficult rise of China with 
powers such as the US and Japan.”46 
Former Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal has suggested India need not choose between 
either Japan or China as a partner; it can cooperate with Japan on China policy and in other 
areas where they have a shared interest, and with China in areas that deliver mutual benefits.47 
Furthermore, even if India saw value in working together with Japan and the US, it may have 
lacked motivation to team up with Australia.48
In its September 26, 2017 issue, the Japanese edition of Newsweek magazine ran a special 
feature titled “Indo no kyozou” (“an Indian giant elephant”), which noted in effect, “while Japan 
looks to India as a partner to help contain China,” India does not yet actually have enough power 
to compete with China nor is it necessarily pro-West or anti-China. While India would prefer to 
follow an independent approach to China, collaborating only with Japan will still not be sufficient. 
That is presumably why it will be compelled to rely on the Quad framework as well.
As indicated earlier in Fig. 1, at the regional level, the Indian Ocean counts as the primary 
battleground for Indian diplomacy at this time. China, moreover, will be India’s main counterpart 
in that engagement. Given that India is pursuing a two-pronged policy49 of both engagement and 
hedging with respect to China, Quad discussions involving the diplomatic authorities are a viable 
and realistic option for diplomacy at this stage.
On closer examination, India could utilize the Quad as a mechanism to curb China’s ambitions 
and respond to its criticism of the Quad through exchanges at the working level, not at the 
head-of-state or foreign-minister levels. Of course, as a formal participant in the summit-level 
conferences of SCO and the BRICS (five emerging national economies) summits, India is also 
prepared to seek elevated Quad status at any time. Moreover, the foreign ministers of Russia, 
India, and China (RIC) have met regularly since 2002, and convened their 15th meeting in India 
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in December 2017. 
Moreover, India and China has established the meeting of the Special Representatives of the 
two countries in 2003 and its 22nd meeting between National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and State 
Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi has held in December 2019. Also, Prime Minister Modi 
emphasized “inclusive” nature of the Indo-Pacific at his keynote address at Shangri La Dialogue 
in June 2018. He might have intended to tell China “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” to signify 
its inclusive nature and not excluding China. Basically, India would like to keep stable relations 
with China.
India has pursued a balancing act with China and Russia on the one hand and Japan and 
the US on the other. From another angle, India may be viewed as a country that has engaged 
in cooperation with Japan and the US in the Indian Ocean and with China and Russia on the 
Eurasian continent. As one element of its continental strategy, India has been working to put 
into motion its International North-South Transport Corridor plan, an undertaking that will 
establish improved sea, rail, and road connections for cargo flows between India (Mumbai), Iran, 
Azerbaijan, and Russia (Table 1).
4.4 China’s apprehensions about the Quad
China categorically rejected the Quad when it first materialized in 2007 and deemed the 
multilateral Japan-US-India, US-Australia-India, and Japan-US-Australia-India frameworks as 
policies aimed at encircling China.50 It has reacted to the latest incarnation of the Quad in much 
the same way. For example, Chinese experts have warned that the four-way dialogue signifies 
an effort to contain China and that it will stymie regional development.51 Additionally, as an 
alternative to rebalancing policies in the Asia-Pacific, the Indo-Pacific strategy has been viewed as 
an undertaking with the objective of disrupting the BRI but that is destined to fail.52 
The Quad, moreover, has been described as an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).53 During a press conference on November 13, 2017, Geng Shuang, Deputy 
Director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Information Department, hinted at China’s misgivings 
about the Quad with his emphasis that it should be a framework that encourages cooperation by 
all relevant countries, not a mechanism for exclusion.54 In fact, representatives of the Quad have 
been upgraded from the bureau-head level to foreign minister level for the first time in September 
2019 at the New York meeting during the United Nations General Assembly.
5. Future prospects
Geopolitical developments in the Indo-Pacific have shifted the focus to the question of how to 
deal with China. China has rallied from a history of humiliation that stretches back to the Opium 
Wars and now aspires to achieve the “Chinese dream” through a grand resurgence of the Chinese 
people.55 In other words, one could argue that China is striving to wrest hegemonic dominance in 
this region from the US and establish a China-centric international order. In a sense, it appears to 
be in the process of acquiring the capacity to build a new international order and establish itself 
as the rule-maker. 
Since the start of the twenty-first century, the situation in the Indo-Pacific has been marked by 
the growing national power of China and the relative decline of the US, which has been losing its 
capacity to keep China in check.56  
Under such development, as a strategic framework in the Indo-Pacific for Japan, the US, 
Australia, and India, the Quad has been brought into existence to counter these trends. Neither 
Japan nor India are capable of halting China’s growing influence on their own, nor can they rely 
on the US. They have no choice but to turn to “minilateral” cooperative mechanisms that occupy 
an intermediate position somewhere between the bilateral and multilateral approaches. Unlike 
Europe, Asia does not yet have any well-established economic or security frameworks. The 
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implication is that the Quad will serve as an inescapable regional mechanism for the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) for East Asia or the East Asian Community. Since 
the RCEP is one of the main components of Japan’s, Indo-Pacific policy along with the Quad, 
India’s withrawal from it said in Novmber 2019 would be the big misculculation for Japan.
India has aspirations of major-power status. For now, however, strategies based on partnering 
mechanisms are its only option. The Japan-US alliance was the single largest infrastructural 
cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy. However, Japan’s dependence on the US appears to be 
softening. Given these conditions, ties between Japan and the India will continue to grow closer 
and develop even further.57 The US cannot be described as an ally that Japan can always rely on 
100 percent; India, however, is in a position to complement that relationship. India actually faces a 
similar situation, itself. After the Cold War, Russia harnessed its semi-alliance functions to provide 
backing for Indian efforts in diplomacy. 
However, since the mid-2010s, Russia’s leanings toward China have grown more pronounced. 
Moreover, ties between China and Pakistan have rapidly grown much closer as an outcome 
of the CPEC project and also in reaction to the cooling trend in US-Pakistan ties. Given these 
developments, Japan is a welcome presence in India’s eyes.58
That said, as is commonly the case with close bilateral ties, the relationship between 
Japan and India may be described as a marriage of convenience because Japan is pursuing 
policies to sustain the status quo while India has future aspirations of becoming a major power. 
Consequently, one cannot discount the possibility of disparities arising between Japan and India 
in terms of awareness or within the context of policy implementation. Although such disparities 
have not seriously harmed their bilateral relations up to now, major problems could emerge in the 
future.
The US, Japan, China, Australia, and Indonesia to say the least of India are all countries with 
significant powers of influence in the Indo-Pacific. Although their current administrations are 
already positioned or seen likely to retain the reins of government. Modi government continues 
in its second term by its ruling party, Bharatiya Janata Party has won the landslide victory in 
April–May 2019 general election. Therefore, India’s Indo-Pacific policy is able to understand in 
terms of its continuity. 
Although not discussed in this paper, the North Korea issue will be a major factor for 
uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific. Relations between Japan and India in the Indo-Pacific will continue 
to face these uncertainties as well as a set of unpredictable conditions in the years ahead.
A sense of mutual affinity is at the root of the relationship between Japan and India, and 
that foundation is not going to be shaken. That said, Japan-India ties have transitioned from a 
limited bilateral relationship to a bilateral relationship with a cross-regional emphasis, and that 
relationship can be expected to develop a more-realistic political and economic dimension. Japan 
needs to move beyond the RCEP and TPP frameworks in the economic arena and the Quad in 
the strategic arena and act as quickly as possible to build an inclusive multilateral framework 
by expanding and strengthening the East Asian Community and welcomes the participation of 
China. Japan and India are both entering an era that will call on them to fulfill their commitments 
to broader Asia and the global community.59 In the process, they will face the necessity of 
looking beyond their mutually complementary bilateral relationship and recognizing it as a new 
international asset to the Indo-Pacific at large.60
 (January 13, 2018. Updated on February 27, 2020)
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